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ABSTRACT 
The move toward e-government has seen many institutions put special focus on 
the need for security, especially that of authentication. Single-factor password-based 
systems have been proven inadequate in safeguarding online financial and e-government 
service transactions. Industry adoption of Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) has also been 
piecemeal. To mitigate these deficiencies, the Singapore Government, in 2008, put forth a 
Call-for-Collaboration (CFC) seeking industry and academic participation in defining a 
National Authentication Framework (NAF), with the dual aim of providing for a 
national-level 2FA system and broadening the market for authentication services, and, in 
so doing, providing the user with a better authentication experience. This thesis will 
detail, discuss, and compare the various token types and identity frameworks (PKI, 
SAML, WS-F, OpenID, and Infocard) that make up an authentication system, and make 
recommendations on the best combination of technologies, protocols, and standards that, 
when implemented, would not only fulfill the requirements of the CFC, but also position 
it well for future enhancement. 
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The National Authentication Framework (NAF) Call-for-collaboration (CFC) was 
launched in 2008 as part of the Singapore Government’s plan to provide for a national-
level Two-factor Authentication (2FA) system, broaden the market for authentication 
services, and enhance the user experience. The CFC calls for proposals from industry and 
academia for a standards-based system that would permit the user the choice of 
Authentication Operator (AO) and token type used to access an online service. Two 
requirements listed will have significant impact on the final proposed implementation 
model: The first is that non-repudiation is to be a feature of the system, and the second is 
that all proposed technologies must have received recognition as a standard. These 
requirements serve as assessment criteria in the analysis and selection of token types and 
identity frameworks that would best serve the NAF. 
The requirement for non-repudiation impacts the choice of token type: Only 
asymmetric cryptographic keys would, when implemented with Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) in place, offer non-repudiation through the application of digital signatures to 
online transactions. Other token types possess no such characteristic and are thus 
relegated to transactions that do not require non-repudiation. That the proposed model 
incorporates only recognized standards limits the choice of identity framework to the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0 standard. It is fortunate, though, that 
the SAML v2.0 standard also excels in all other assessment criteria, including being fit-
for-purpose, supporting proxy authentication and maintaining user anonymity.  
The proposed implementation model, incorporating both PKI and SAML v2.0 as 
the underlying identity framework, and the choice of the asymmetric cryptographic token 
for its supportability of non-repudiation is, in the author’s opinion, the best possible 
combination of technologies that would not only fulfill the requirements of the NAF, but 
also position the NAF well for future enhancements. That last consideration is especially 
critical when considering the amount of resources expected to be expended on such a 
major effort. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS BACKGROUND 
The desire to reduce bureaucracy, and to better engage the general population, are 
two of the reasons that have led numerous governments to embark on programs that 
would see traditional services being made accessible online. The ten-year Intelligent 
National Masterplan (iN2015) to be implemented by the Infocomm Development 
Authority of Singapore (IDA) is one such program. To date, nearly 370 online 
Government-to-business (GtoB) and Government-to-citizen (GtoC) services have been 
made available [1], joining the substantial number of e-banking services already 
available. This proliferation, however, has led to a greater frequency of malicious 
activities. Because of this, as well as the increase in the sophistication of attacks being 
performed, there is a definite need for stronger forms of protection for online 
transactions. To increase this protection, among the many initiatives that are part of 
iN2015, is the development of a National Authentication Framework (NAF). The aim of 
the NAF is to [2]: 
1. “Enable consistent strong authentication for end-users accessing key 
online services;” and  
2. “Make the process of authenticating online identities more vigorous, 
thereby boosting online trust and confidence in individuals accessing the 
next generation of online services.”  
B. AUTHENTICATION: A DEFINITION 
Authentication is defined as the verification of the “identity of a user, process, or 
device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information system” 
[3]. Authentication is a constituent component of integrity, itself defined as the process of 
“guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity” [3]. Integrity is a component of 
the Information Assurance (IA) confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad 
which constitutes the core principles of information security [4].   
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Authentication is accomplished through one of the following: 1) demonstrating 
knowledge of a shared secret, or “something the user knows”; 2) presentation of an 
authorized token, or “something the user has”; or 3) presentation of a unique physical 
characteristic, or “something the user is.” These proofs of identity are collectively known 
as factors of identity. The withdrawal of cash from an automated teller machine (ATM) 
illustrates the use of factors of identity. A user presents his ATM card token, “something 
the user has,” either through swiping or insertion, followed by the input of his personal 
identification number (PIN), “something the user knows,” onto a keypad in order to 
proceed with the transaction. In Japan, users are obliged to additionally present either the 
thumb or index finger to a scanner as a further form of identification, “something the user 
is.” There have been efforts at identifying additional factors for authentication, including 
“someone the user knows” [5], but the latter is of limited use in non-contact situations. 
The use of Single-factor Authentication (SFA) in the form of a password or PIN 
for authentication is prevalent in the majority of online transactions. The continued 
reliance on SFA has been advised against in view of the relative ease with which such 
authentication means can be subverted. A prominent case in Singapore involved the 
compromise of 21 Post Office Savings Bank Internet banking accounts in June 2002 [6]. 
This led to the voluntary conversion to a Two-factor Authentication (2FA) system  in 
May 2003 [7] with the addition of a hardware One-time Password (OTP) token, a first in 
the region at the time. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), 
having recognized the inadequacy of SFA, had also suggested that financial institutions 
adopt multi-factor authentication in order to mitigate the risks of account fraud and 
identity theft [8] in 2002.  
Two-factor Authentication methods are aimed particularly at overcoming the 
shortcomings of password-only SFA methods, and are effective against passive forms of 
malicious attacks. Against active attacks, however, certain forms of 2FA unfortunately 
are not as effective [9].  The choice of biometrics, or “something the user is” type tokens, 
as a factor for remote authentication, is limited. Thus, biometric authentication is better 
suited for local use, whereby the user presents a livesample of his physical characteristic  
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for on-site comparison against his previously registered copy without going through a 
network [10]. The selection of the type of 2FA method is, then, particularly crucial in 
order to sustain secure online transactions. 
C. NAF: IMPETUS, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES 
Current access to online government services is through password-based SFA 
means, locally referred to as SINGPASS. This restricts the number of services available 
online to those that require relatively low assurance. In the financial sector, 2FA has been 
implemented to a large extent in a stove-piped manner, resulting in consumers having to 
manage separate tokens for each institution with which they have a relationship; e.g., a 
user may use a hardware OTP token for transactions with Institution A but rely on Out of 
Band short messaging system (SMS)–based tokens for transactions with Institution B. 
The number of tokens that may potentially be required to be in a user’s possession will 
grow as more institutions adopt strong authentication mechanisms. The continuance of 
the current stove-piped system will make token management cumbersome. 
With the more interoperable NAF implemented, the Singapore government aims 
to put in place an infrastructure that not only strengthens the authentication process, 
particularly through the addition of a second authentication factor for online government 
services, but also streamlines the user experience for consumers. That is, a consumer may 
choose to possess a single token acceptable for all online transactions or may choose to 
be selective as to the number of tokens he or she possesses and also as to with which 
institutions each token will be affiliated. Any number of reasons may govern the 
consumer’s choice of token type and affiliation, including that of per-transaction cost, 
hardware and software requirements, or user convenience. Even more important is that 
the token must be acceptable to the relying institution based on a predetermined level of 
assurance afforded by characteristics of the token type and its concomitant infrastructure 
and administration. This requirement for choice will engender the growth of a market in 
strong authentication services. With a larger consumer base, as compared to previous 
implementations, which were limited to a single institution’s clientele, consumers will 
benefit through overall lowered costs as a result of economies of scale and competition. 
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Relying institutions will also no longer need to maintain their own private authentication 
infrastructure, but can instead outsource such to institutions better equipped for meeting 
the ever-changing nature of technology, as well as dealing with the associated risks. To 
enable this market, and to allow for a level-playing field, however, any implementation 
must be standards-based; and, hence, it is part of the NAF’s scope to ensure that proposed 
solutions are interoperable. 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
Based upon the requirements set forth by the CFC document for the NAF, 
coupled with an in-depth look into the current state of the art in terms of authentication 
methods and protocols, this thesis aims to suggest a framework model that would be 
suited not just to fulfilling the requirements, but to ensuring that the derived system is 
well positioned to meet future challenges. This will be achieved first by illustrating with a 
use case the interactions between the principal actors throughout the authentication 
process; this use case will serve as a baseline reference in Chapter II. An analysis of the 
various types of authentication tokens and associated form factors, as well as supporting 
authentication frameworks, will be detailed in Chapters III and IV, respectively. In 
Chapter V, the best-fit components identified in previous chapters will be amalgamated 
into a system in compliance with the requirements of the NAF, illustrated by a use case 
depicting how the proposed framework supports authentication. The thesis will conclude 
with Chapter VI, which details how system requirements affect the overall 
implementation design and the possible implications. 
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II. AUTHENTICATION USE CASE MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW 
From a user perspective, the authentication process as typified by the presentation 
of a user ID and password is a familiar one. The underlying exchange of data to enable 
authentication, however, is anything but simple. The complexity derives from the number 
of parties involved, inter-party interactions, and other associated factors. Prior to deriving 
the technical implementation, a use case model depicting these interactions will be 
developed to serve as a basis for the selection of the most appropriate supporting 
technologies. The use case itself will be developed from a functional model that details 
the functions of each actor in the use case. 
B. USE CASE ACTORS 
An actor represents a party to the transaction, e.g., a customer or a bank. The 
actors of an authentication can be specified based on their roles in the process [10], or as 
abstractions for the actual system users in a specified scenario [2]. Greater clarity is 
achieved through role separation; to achieve congruency with the CFC, however, the 
actors will be specified in terms of actual abstractions from the perspective of the 
provision of a service. Where necessary, the description of each actor will include the 
roles each encompasses. Although typical implementations of authentication mechanisms 
see the involvement of only two actors, i.e., the actor requesting a service and the actor 
providing the service, a third party may be necessary as an intermediary if one 
authentication mechanism is used by the one actor to access services provided by more 
than one other actor. The three principle actors in the authentication process are as 
follows. 
1. Authentication Operators 
An Authentication Operator (AO) is a provider of strong authentication services, 
inclusive of functional and managerial responsibilities, deemed necessary for the proper 
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administration of credentials. AOs are also otherwise known as “Credential Service 
Provider,” “Credential Issuer,” and “Verifier” [10], [11]. The term credential is used in 
this instance to define an “object that authoritatively binds an identity to a token 
possessed and controlled by a person” [10] or, in shorter parlance, a verified token, such 
as an authorized smart card issued by the bank. Verisign is but one example of an AO. In 
particular, Verisign provides digital certification services to Web sites. 
2. Service Providers 
A Service Provider (SP) is a provider of online services to service consumers. SPs 
rely on AOs to authenticate users prior to providing services to the users. SPs are 
alternatively termed “Relying Parties” [10]. In the context of this thesis, SPs are 
government agencies and other institutions, both public and private, that support online 
transactions.  
3. Users  
Users are subscribers to online services, e.g., citizens, residents. Users are most 
typically the initiators of an online transaction. Since it is the user’s identity that requires 
verification, the user is alternatively also commonly described as a “Claimant” during the 
authentication process because the user is making a claim regarding his identity. 
C. AUTHENTICATION COMPONENT FUNCTIONS 
Several functions have been identified that are necessary to actualize the 
authentication processes. The functions have been adapted from the Australian National 
E-Authentication Framework (NEAF) [11]. The functions are executed by the actors at 
specific points of the authentication process, making up the Functional Implementation 
Model. 
1. User Registration 
The user registration function represents the processes associated with the initial 
creation of an electronic identity (e-identity) for a user, encompassing Evidence of 
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Identity (EOI) or Evidence of Relationship (EOR) processes, e.g., the selection of an 
online identifier (user ID) when registering for a new bank account at a bank’s branch 
office by physically providing one’s SSN and a valid driving license as proof of one’s 
identity. 
2. Token Issuance (and Management) 
A token is “something that the Claimant possesses and controls used to 
authenticate the Claimant’s identity” [10]. A token is provided to the user for subsequent 
online authentication transactions. No token is perpetual, and the issuing agency is 
responsible for ensuring the validity of the token throughout its life cycle and for any 
subsequent mitigation actions required, should a malfunction occur. Examples of a token 
include a sealed envelope containing the user’s PIN, or an OTP key-fob. Greater detail on 
the types and characteristics of various tokens will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
3. User Enrollment 
User enrollment refers to the act of binding an authentication token to a known 
instance of a user identity within an Information Technology (IT) resource context, 
resulting in establishing a credential. For example, a credential is created when a user 
initially logs into the bank’s Web site with a user ID and PIN, then registers the OTP key-
fob by entering the unique key-fob serial number into the bank’s Web page; those actions 
cause the unique key-fob to be associated with the user’s account. 
4. Credential Verification 
Credential verification is the verification of an enrolled token, which takes place 
as a precursor to enabling the conduct of a transaction. It encompasses the issuance of a 
positive identity indicator, known as an assertion, to a requesting SP. For example, a 
bank’s Web page will seek entry of the OTP from the user’s key-fob (i.e., the token) for 
verification of the user’s identity prior to servicing the user’s request. The term credential 
is used in this context, as opposed to token: the token would have been enrolled and 
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bound to an identifier, prior to the need for verification. Validation, which relates to the 
checking of the status of the credential at the time of verification, is implied. 
D. FUNCTIONAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Overview 
This section defines a functional model specification incorporating the defined 
component functions. Three existing models—Siloed, Centralized, and Federated—are 
first described. Selection criteria are presented against which the models are analyzed. A 
fourth model, Interoperable, is thereafter developed based on the existing models, with 
augmentation based on the established selection criteria. 
2. Functional Models 
Three functional models have been identified in support of authentication—
Siloed, Centralized, and Federated [11]. Each model differs primarily in the actor 
responsible for the provision of component functions. The details of the three models are 
captured in Figure 1, and explained below. 
 
Figure 1.   Functional Implementation Models. After [11] 
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a. Siloed 
This model is representative of current authentication mechanisms being 
deployed by major financial institutions in Singapore. All component functions are 
provided by the SP. Individual institutions contract separately for the procurement and 
establishment of in-house proprietary authentication mechanisms [12], [13]. This results 
in individuals possessing multiple authentication tokens, one for each institution with 
which the individual has a relationship. As this model eliminates the need for AOs, it 
results in a simpler transactional process, as well as the fastest transactions. The need for 
in-house infrastructure, though, would require high initial capital outlay, as well as 
continuous life-cycle costs, which may prove to be a barrier to entry for all but the largest 
institutions. The model does not benefit from economies of scale. 
b. Centralized 
This model sees a user registering with an AO for the provision of a global 
identifier and a token. The user’s credentials (global identifier and token) are 
subsequently enrolled with each SP. When a user requires a service, the user presents his 
credentials to the SP, which will subsequently be redirected to the AO for verification. As 
authentication services are outsourced, SPs no longer need bear the costs involved in 
maintaining in-house systems. The cost to both SP and the individual is reduced in light 
of the shared infrastructure. Individuals may also have a choice in the form factor and 
method of authentication. Concerns include the monopolistic dominance of a single 
provider, a single point of failure, increased transaction time, and privacy issues arising 
from having a global identifier registered across all SPs. 
c. Federated 
The Federated Model differs from the centralized model in that there is no 
requirement for a global identifier. The AO is responsible only for the issuance of the 
token. The user enrolls the provided token with the SP; the token and its attributes will be 
associated with the user’s unique identifier with the SP, resulting in a credential. Each 
time the user requires a service, the user presents his or her credential to the SP, which 
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will request separate verification of the attached token from the AO. Positive verification 
is communicated back to the SP from the AO in the form of an assertion. This 
mechanism serves as the basis for Single Sign-on (SSO), which translates to greater user 
convenience because only a single authentication process is required to access multiple 
SPs, assuming that all relying SPs have a relationship with the same AO. The Federated 
Model provides an additional layer of privacy to the consumer. There is no global 
identifier, as with the Centralized Model, resulting in there being less risk of associating 
contents from different SPs to the same user. Initial transaction duration is expected to be 
longer as a result of the greater complexity of the SSO operation; but overall performance 
would be greatly enhanced. 
3. Selection Criteria 
With most systems already implementing the Siloed Model, the emphasis of the 
NAF would be the implementation of a system whereby more commonality could be 
achieved. The decision as to whether a centralized or federated model would be better 
suited to the NAF would be dependent upon the requirements as laid out in the CFC. 
Three important requirements have been identified.  
a. Criterion #1 
Cross-authentication of individuals/SPs is to be enabled across AOs, e.g., 
an individual A utilizing AO X will be able to utilize services provided by SP B, utilizing 
AO Y without a noticeable degradation in performance. 
b. Criterion #2 
Implemented systems should incorporate/build upon current systems, i.e., 
they should support SP-specific user ID and password/PIN as the first authentication 
factor in a 2FA implementation. 
 11
c. Criterion #3 
Users will have a choice of AOs, token type, and form factor employed for 
authentication. Accordingly, each SP may determine the minimal level of assurance 
necessary to access its services, translating to which of the various methods would be 
acceptable to the SP as an authentication means. 
4. Analysis 
The characteristics of the centralized and federated models were compared based 
upon the criteria developed in the previous subsection. The results of the comparison are 
discussed below: 
a. Criterion #1 
In the Centralized Model, with only a single AO, there is no requirement 
for cross-authentication. For the Federated Model, the use of Persistent Pseudonymous 
Identifiers (PPI) may be necessary between AO X and AO Y, and between AO X and SP 
B, in order to ensure that the generated assertion can be mapped to the user at the SP end.   
b. Criterion #2 
In terms of criteron 2, for the Centralized Model, the use of a global 
identifier may require a PPI to map currently-existing IDs with SPs to the new global 
identifier. The nature of the Federated Model supports this requirement organically, since 
users can maintain their original unique IDs as registered with the SP.  
c. Criterion #3 
The strength of the Centralized Model lies in there being a single AO. The 
requirement that users and SPs have a choice in their AOs violates this characteristic of 
the centralized model. The Federated Model organically supports the use of different 
AOs and is, hence, well suited to fulfill this requirement. 
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From criterion 1 the lack of any need for cross-authentication puts the 
Centralized Model at an advantage over the Federated Model. From criterion 2, the 
inherent support of existing authentication processes gives the Federated Model the 
advantage. From criterion 3, the Centralized Model’s inability to support multiple AOs, 
however, results in the Federated Model being the logical choice as the basis for the 
development of the use case.  The Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand governments’ 
choice of the Federated Model also lends weight to its selection [11], [14]. However, the 
SSO characteristic of the Federated Model may be considered excessive for the proposed 
NAF. There is no explicit requirement for an SSO functionality across domains, i.e., 
between that of the government and the private sector. Neither are there explicit 
restrictions on implementations that allow this functionality. Rather, it is the envisaged 
usage of the system by the government, as a means of imposing a second authentication 
factor to that of the single-factor system already in place, that predisposes any upcoming 
system toward that configuration, i.e., any user who is logged onto a non-governmental 
SP, and who would subsequently wish to use a government service, would not be able to 
use any inherent SSO functionality because the government service would require the 
entry of the first authentication factor that is separate from that already provided to the 
non-governmental SP. This configuration, using the NAF as the second authentication 
factor, is also in sync with the PIN-based single authentication factor system employed 
by local financial institutions. This system utilizes the same PIN both for ATM 
transactions and as a password to the user ID. This mechanism demands that the PIN 
remain under the control of the issuing organization, the SP, for privacy and security 
reasons. Any allowance for SSO among private and public entities is expected to require 
a level of agreement between all parties. That agreement is expected to require much 
more work than existing agreements among collections of educational institutions—
currently, the most prolific users of SSO. That said, within the government, access to 
services provided by different agencies is expected to benefit from SSO; it is only at the 
public–private boundary that no compromise seems possible in the short run. 
Nevertheless, it would be shortsighted to put in place a system that does not have the 
potential for SSO, should the necessary agreements come into effect in the future. 
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5. Interoperable Model 
It would be more accurate to define a modified Federated Model with a focus on 
interoperability at the AO level as the basis for the use case. This model, to be termed the 
Interoperable Model, inherits all of the characteristics of the Federated Model, less the 
SSO characteristic. The Interoperable Model, denoted by placing a superscript I to AO to 
indicate interoperability among the AOs, is captured in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Interoperable Functional Implementation Model 
E. USE CASE MODEL 
Based upon the Interoperable Model, a baseline use case model is developed to 
illustrate the authentication process. The use case, in which both user and SP share a 
common AO, is reminiscent of the Centralized Model and is considered trivial. The use 
case developed will be based on the condition whereby user and SP subscribe to different 
AOs for the provision of authentication services. The differentiation of AOs is as follows. 
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1. AO(USER) 
Defined as the AO to which the user is subscribed, the AO(USER) is responsible 
for credential issuance and management for the user; synonymous with the AO(Issuing) 
term used in the CFC. 
2. AO(SP)  
Defined as the AO that the SP has selected for the provision of credential 
verification services; AO(SP) is synonymous with the AO(Front) term used in the CFC. 
 
Figure 3.   Authentication Use Case 
The authentication use case takes places in the following steps, as depicted in 
Figure 3: 
1. Credential is issued to subscribed user. 
2. Pre-registered user (enrolled) presents first factor to SP for authentication. 
3. SP directs user to AO(SP) for second factor authentication. 
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4. AO(SP) directs user to AO(User) for presentation of second factor. 
5. AO(User) verifies presented second factor; issues assertion to AO(SP). 
6. AO(SP) transmits assertion to SP, verifying identity of user. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a baseline use case model, detailing the interactions between the 
various actors as part of the authentication process, has been developed that will serve as 
a reference for the technical implementation model. The technical implementation model 
will be developed in later chapters of this thesis. 
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III. AUTHENTICATION TOKENS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II, we touched on how a token would be used as part of the 
authentication process. As previously mentioned, a token is either “something you have,” 
“something you know,” or “something you are” that can be used to positively identify the 
user. This being the case, the choice of the kind of token is cardinal to the implementation 
of any authentication system. Each token possesses a distinct set of characteristics that 
will render its use advantageous under certain conditions and yet still susceptible to 
certain threats. In this chapter, the different types of tokens and their characteristics will 
be presented, with particular interest paid to the kind of threats to which each token type 
is susceptible. The chapter will continue with a survey of the current form factors that 
implement/store tokens. This chapter will conclude with a recommendation on the form 
factor and token that would best support the requirements of the NAF. 
B. TOKEN TYPES 
A survey of literature providing guidelines for the implementation of an 
authentication system yielded varied classifications for the types of tokens. Factor-based 
lists [14] classify tokens in accordance with the underlying factor type. While simple and 
elegant, there is no clear distinction among the variety of tokens within a single factor. 
Functional-type lists [10], [15] often combine a token type and a form factor, obfuscating 
the relationship of the two while resulting in a lengthy catalogue. The list of token types 
presented below, borrowing heavily from the NIST SP 800-63 [10], provides a succinct 
and comprehensive listing of the current token types, exclusive of the form factor which 
will be used to implement the token. Arranged loosely in order of factor type are the 
“something you know” Memorized Secret Token and Pre-Registered Knowledge Token; 
“something you have” Look-up Secret Token, Out of Band Token, One-time Password 
Token, and Cryptographic Token; and “something you are” Biometric Token. The final 
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token, while not strictly a token type, combines different factors into a Hybrid Token. 
The definitions of each token type are as follows. 
1. Memorized Secret Token  
This token type is a shared secret between the user and the verifier that the user 
memorizes, e.g., a password.  
2. Pre-registered Knowledge Token  
The Pre-registered Knowledge Token is a set of prompts/responses that has been 
established between the user and the verifier. The user responds with the appropriate 
answer to a prompt from the verifier, e.g., a response of “Lee” to the question, “What is 
your mother’s maiden name?” 
3. Look-up Secret Token 
A database of one or more shared secrets between the user and the verifier is 
defined as a Look-up Secret Token. The user responds with the appropriate secret to a 
prompt from the verifier, e.g., a code book.  
4. Out of Band Token  
An Out of Band Token is a secret sent from the verifier to the user through a pre-
established secondary communications medium; the user subsequently submits that secret 
into the primary channel for authentication, e.g., the transmission of a PIN to a user’s cell 
phone through SMS, which the user subsequently enters into the appropriate field on the 
verifier’s Web site.  
5. One-time Password  
This token type is a time-limited password obtained from a device the user 
possesses, hence the term “one-time,” e.g., a PIN generated by a key fob, which is 
subsequently entered into the appropriate field on the verifier’s Web site. Authentication 
is achieved when the entered PIN is the same as that generated at the verifier’s end.   
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6. Cryptographic Token  
A persistent symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic key stored in or generated by 
either hardware or software means is a Cryptographic Token. For example, the 
cryptographic key is used to encrypt a challenge issued by the verifier and thereafter 
submitted back as a response. The verifier decrypts the response to obtain the originally 
issued challenge and, if it matches what was previously issued, effectively authenticates 
the user since only the user would have the correct key to encrypt the challenge.  
7. Biometric Token  
This token type is a distinguishing physiological or behavioral characteristic 
presented for verification against a database, e.g., a thumb-print image captured on a 
reader.  
8. Hybrid  
A combination of two or more token types used for authentication would be 
considered by the author as a Hybrid token. While not strictly a token type, hybrid tokens 
consist of multiple tokens, often with differing factor types, yielding what is known as a 
multi-factor token, e.g., the use of a biometric token to unlock a smart card containing the 
user’s unique private cryptographic key.  
C. TOKEN THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The strength of a token and its use as part of an authentication system is very 
much dependent upon its resilience in the face of current threats. Each token type is 
characterized by strengths and weaknesses, which must be assessed for suitability of each 
for use in the NAF. Table 1, based upon a list similar to the one found in the NIST SP 
800-63 standard, lists the most current threats to authentication tokens. Appended to each 
threat are the token types that are most susceptible to that threat. Hybrid tokens are not 
included in the list. The following discussion looks at each token factor type in turn. 
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Table 1.   Threats to Authentication Token Types. After [10] 



































































1. “Something You Know” Token 
“Something you know” tokens are susceptible to most forms of attacks. Their 
inherent susceptibility is exacerbated by other conditions:  1) User behavioral weaknesses 
expose the token to social engineering attacks. 2) Limits on users’ recollection abilities 
not only result in creation of passwords of limited character complexity and number but 
also subject those passwords to repeated use in different domains.  3) Vulnerability to 
cross-references allows the actual password or knowledge token to be implied or deduced 
from open source material; e.g., a password based a user’s birth date can be obtained 
easily from the information on a user’s FaceBook home page. The weakness of this token 
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type was one of the main factors for the push for a 2FA system, in which the second 
factor belongs to one of the two remaining token factor types. 
2. “Something You Have” Token 
Being physically manifested, “something you have” tokens are susceptible to 
simple theft. Beyond that, the vulnerabilities of the token types within this category differ 
greatly. A Look-up Secret Token is subject to most of the vulnerabilities inherent in 
“something you know”–type tokens, though it does afford greater protection should there 
be limited reuse of the token; limited reuse would overcome the replay attack 
vulnerability. An Out of Band Token provides greater protection since it requires the 
attacker to have access to the secondary communications medium used to transmit the 
token. A phishing Web site may not have the necessary data, e.g., cell phone number, to 
send the token to in order to complete the sham even if a user unwittingly encounters a 
phishing site. An OTP token takes this protection further by limiting the validity of the 
token in the time domain, usually not more than 30 seconds. A Cryptographic Token, 
while perpetual, is the least vulnerable token due in part to the generally concealed nature 
of the token: the user has rare access to the exact characters of the token; and the length 
of the token, typically many times longer than that of a password or OTP pass-phrase, 
makes brute force attacks infeasible. 
3. “Something You Are” Token 
The use of biometrics has already been restricted to local mechanisms in Chapter 
I. That said, biometrics may still be subjected to attacks even in this limited setting, such 
as by the lifting of an imprint left on the reader following a subscriber’s use. 
D. TOKEN TYPE SELECTION 
The previous section expounded on the vulnerabilities of the various token types. 
While vulnerability remains a key determinant in the choice of token type, a key 
characteristic that tokens selected for the NAF must possess is the ability to support non-
repudiation. 
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Non-repudiation, while not a feature of a token, has been explicitly listed as a 
requirement for the NAF in support of certain government online services. To realize 
non-repudiation, any message exchanged between the user and the SP is required to have 
in place a means of proving undeniably the authenticity of its source and its destination, 
i.e., a sender cannot deny sending the message, nor can the receiver deny having received 
the message. This requirement influences the choice of token type because only certain 
tokens and their associated mechanisms satisfy the conditions necessary for non-
repudiation. Chief among these conditions would be that the element associating an actor 
to a message be irrevocably unique at the time of the transaction. This condition 
effectively eliminates all schemes that are based on token types whereby a user 
demonstrates knowledge or possession of a secret shared with the verifier. If this secret is 
leveraged as a means toward non-repudiation—e.g., by attaching an encrypted digest of 
the message to an outgoing e-mail as a form of a digital signature using a shared 
symmetric key—there is a chance that either the user or verifier may falsely claim that a 
message originated from the other party instead of themselves, since both the user and the 
verifier have equal access to the same symmetric encryption key and, hence, are both able 
to form the digital signature. Hybrid schemes that generate a “signature” based upon a 
combination of transaction attributes is still subject to replication by an entity, usually the 
verifier, with knowledge of the component attributes of the signature [16]. This leaves 
asymmetric cryptographic schemes as the only reasonable choice for solutions that 
require non-repudiation. The private key, which only the user possesses and uses to 
digitally sign any outgoing messages, may be irrevocably traced back to the user should 
the need arise, assuming a robust Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is in place. Security is 
further enhanced if cryptographic operations that generate the digital signature are 
performed by a hardware device unique to the user, as compared to software variants, 
which are subject to risks inherent particularly to software design. The generation of 
digital signatures with the use of an asymmetric key is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
From the previous discussion on authentication threats, it is clear that 
Cryptographic Tokens would provide the best protection against most current threats. 
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When the need for non-repudiation is factored in, the only choice would be an 
Asymmetric Key Cryptographic Token. That said, users may still choose to leverage on 
token types that do not support non-repudiation for authentication to SPs that do not 
require it. This is especially pertinent in view of the relatively larger infrastructure 
footprint required of the user to support non-repudiation, with a direct impact on 
mobility. For this subset of transactions, the remaining token types that are of the 
“something the user has” form may be utilized as the second authentication factor, 
particularly OTP and Out of Band Tokens. 
E. FORM FACTOR TYPES AND SELECTION 
A survey of various authentication operators yielded a large variety of 
authentication form factors. A majority of solutions that claim to apply strong 
authentication principles implement a variation of an OTP mechanism [17], e.g., RSA 
Secure-ID, VASCO Digipass, Aladdin eToken. The major advantage afforded by this 
form of authentication is its connectionless nature. Unfortunately, this method does not 
ensure non-repudiation because both the user and verifier would possess the same OTP. 
Continuing from the previous discussion, only hardware-based, asymmetric key 
cryptography-supporting solutions would be sufficiently strong to withstand current 
threats and yet meet the requirements for non-repudiation. Market trends also show a 
steady increase in the acceptance of PKI-based smart card solutions. This chapter 
discusses various form factors that implement OTP, Out of Band, and Asymmetric Key 
Cryptographic Tokens. 
1. Contact Multiprocessor Smart Card 
A smart card is “a credit-card sized card with an embedded processor and 
memory that can receive input, process it, and provide output” [18]. It operates by 
performing cryptographic operations on inbound data with the user’s private key and then 
outputs the encrypted message back to its source. The smart card has been in use by 
major institutions, including the U.S. Department of Defense. The cost of a basic smart-
card solution is US$23 per individual (smart card US$3[19], smart card reader 
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US$20[20]). The smart card form factor is also familiar to users since all would already 
be in possession of a government-issued ID card. It is not too remote to expect such an ID 
card to be upgraded to smart card specifications as a means toward nationwide 
implementation. Yet, while a smart card solution is fairly cost competitive, the 
requirement for an additional reader may render the solution less attractive in light of the 
current trends towards portability. 
2. USB Token  
A USB token is essentially a key fob containing a built-in USB port with the same 
processing functionality as a smart card. This form factor was designed with the aim of 
eliminating the need for a separate smart card reader. Users need only attach the key fob 
to any available USB port for authentication to be effectively carried out. The security of 
this form factor is strengthened through adherence to the FIPS 140-2 standard, 
safeguarding the cryptographic keys held within through tamper proofing and associated 
methods. This form factor is also congruent with the OTP key fob, which is currently 
issued by most major banking institutions as their means of strong authentication, in 
terms of look and feel and, hence, would be most familiar to users of online banking. The 
price per unit is expected to be less than US$30 per unit [21]. The USB token can be 
further enhanced with the additional requirement of the need for a second token, usually 
biometric or PIN-based, to unlock the cryptographic keys stored within. This addition of 
a token will require an enhancement to the standard smart card/key fob form factor, 
usually through the addition of a key pad or a biometric scanner. This enhancement is 
also available to the smart card form factor. 
3. Contactless Hardware Device  
The USB token, while not requiring a separate reader, still requires direct 
connection via a USB port. The advent of Personal Area Network (PAN) technologies, 
such as Bluetooth and RFID, makes wireless connectivity possible. Consumer devices 
such as smartphones can be leveraged as a means of storing the necessary keys and 
performing the desired cryptographic operations. The smartphone can also be utilized to 
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implement Out of Band token-based solutions, particularly by the entering of an OTP 
token, received via SMS from the AO, into the AO’s authentication page by the user. 
Another use of the smartphone implements biometrics in the form of voice authentication 
as a third authentication factor whereby a user receives a call on his phone (second out-
of-band token) and he is asked to read out his PIN. The system authenticates the user 
based on the unique characteristics of his voice [22]. Most smartphones enable 
connectivity via Bluetooth, though the smartphone may require the installation of an 
additional trusted cryptographic module.  
Another contactless hardware device is a contactless smart card. As the name 
suggests, it has essentially the same functionality as a smart card but with an add-on 
wireless means of connectivity—radio frequency. The performance characteristics of the 
contactless smart are specified by the ISO/IEC 144443 standard; among other features, it 
defines the communications distance at 10 cm. Large-scale implementations include the 
Octopus Card in Hong Kong and the Ezylink card in Singapore. While the cost of a 
contactless smart card is competitive, the lack of a reader in most consumer products 
means this form factor may require significant investment to implement. The cost of a 
contactless reader is expected to be around US$90.00.  
The key issue regarding the use of contactless solutions is security. Wireless 
communications means are associated with numerous security concerns. The complexity 
of smartphones, their dual-use nature for non-secured communications, and the relative 
lack of security inherent in smartphone operating systems [23] increase the chances of 
subversion and subsequent compromise of the embedded cryptographic keys.   
4. Key-fob 
A key-fob is a device similar in look and feel to a key-chain ornament but 
containing electronics capable of issuing a unique OTP upon activation, visible to the 
user through a liquid crystal display. Such systems place no additional demands on users, 
such as needing to use and/or install hardware and software, except for the need to have 
the key-fob in their possession. It is easily revoked from the AO end and can be easily 
replaced. The key fob also benefits from being the dominant form factor in current use. 
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Each key fob costs about US$5.00 [24].Variants of a key fob include the addition of a 
keypad so that the user may enter a PIN to unlock the generated OTP. Such a mechanism 
is similar to the enhanced smart card previously mentioned. 
With each form factor having its own strengths and weaknesses, and in line with 
the government’s aim of providing for choice, it may be best if the decision of which 
form factor to adopt be left to the consumer, based on his or her own lifestyle. Each form 
factor possesses distinct characteristics in terms of footprint, infrastructure investment, 
and security concerns. A caveat is that the selected form factor must be able to implement 
the correct token type for the requested service. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a summary of the various token types in regards to current threats 
has been presented. An asymmetric cryptography-capable token has been selected as the 
best means for authentication while ensuring non-repudiation, whereas an OTP or Out of 
Band token-based system would suffice for systems that do not require non-repudiation. 
In the next chapter, we will look at the identity frameworks that will be leveraged on to 
authenticate the user to the SP. 
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IV. IDENTITY FRAMEWORKS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II, a use case was developed as a baseline reference for the 
implementation of the National Authentication Framework (NAF). Key components of 
the process are those of authentication and the transmission of the assertion from the 
Authentication Operator (AO) to the Service Provider (SP), indicating concurrence as to 
the identity of the user. While authentication in itself is a fairly well-developed 
mechanism, it is the transmission of the assertion that poses a challenge in the 
implementation of the authentication framework. The possible involvement of more than 
a single AO is an issue that has yet to be addressed specifically [25]. The realization of 
both an authentication and an assertion transmission is dependent upon the choice of the 
supporting identity framework. The underlying protocols and standards that make up 
each framework vary in their support of the selected token type and associated 
authentication mechanisms. The key differentiating factor lies in whether a framework is 
Non-repudiation Supporting (NRS) or Non-repudiation Non-supporting (NRNS). It has 
been established in Chapter III that both forms will co-exist as part of the overall NAF. 
This chapter will explore current frameworks that support either of the two forms, 
evaluate their respective suitabilities, and draw a conclusion about the best-fit framework 
for support of the NAF. 
B. IDENTITY FRAMEWORK (NON-REPUDIATION SUPPORTING) 
1. Overview 
The use of asymmetric key cryptography for authentication is supported by a 
collection of entities known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). These entities provide the 




requirements of the NAF. This section will begin with an overview as to how asymmetric 
key cryptography operates, will provide a list of critical supporting standards, and will 
conclude with a description of how these standards are leveraged to enable NRS. 
2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
In Asymmetric Key Cryptography (AKC), as the name suggests, different keys 
are used to encrypt and decrypt the data of interest. Supporting algorithms that offer AKC 
include the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm and the elliptic curve algorithm. While 
each algorithm differs in the means of key generation, the mechanism in which the key-
pairs are utilized remains the same and will be discussed in this section. The use of AKC 
for authentication and generating digital signatures is also discussed.   
a. Encryption and Decryption 
The mechanism for employing encryption and decryption with AKC is as 
follows: Each user has a key-pair, consisting of a public key and a private key. The public 
key is freely available, while the private key is kept only by the user. Assume that user A, 
Alice, wishes to send a message M to user B, Bob. Alice wishes to ensure that no person 
other than Bob will be able to read the message. Upon generation of the message M, 
Alice uses Bob’s public key, KB, to encrypt the message, resulting in MKB. Bob, upon 
receipt of MKB, uses his personal private key, KB-1, to decrypt MKB and successfully 
obtains the message. Because only Bob possesses the requisite private key, only Bob can 
decrypt the message; and no one else, not even Alice, who used Bob’s public key to 
encrypt the message, is able to retrieve the message from its encrypted form. Bob’s 
public key is publicly available in the form of a digital certificate, the structure of which 
will be covered shortly. In effect, each person would have a private key, and a public key, 




Using AKC for authentication usually features a challenge-response 
protocol. The process is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Authentication Process 
Bob wishes to assess a resource controlled by Alice. Alice issues a 
challenge C to Bob. Bob uses his private key KB-1 to encrypt the challenge CKB-1 and 
sends the encrypted challenge, now termed a response, back to Alice. Alice utilizes Bob’s 
public key to decrypt the response. If Bob’s identity (as provided by Bob’s identity being 
“bound” to the public key used by Alice) is authentic, the response will decrypt 
accurately to reveal the challenge. Bob’s identity is verified because only he should have 
possession of the private key that corresponds to the freely available public key used to 
decrypt the response. 
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c. Digital Signature 
A digital signature is the primary means by which non-repudiation is 
effected. Essentially, any message that is accompanied by a digital signature can be 
trusted in terms of its source, since the digital signature is derived from a sender’s private 
key and the message itself. The digital signature generation and verification process is 
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Digital Signature Generation and Verification 
The structure of the digital signature is simple. Bob intends to send a 
message M to Alice. After composing the message, Bob hashes the message, resulting in 
a hashed message MH, and subsequently encrypts the hash with his private key, resulting 
in MHKB-1. This encrypted hash is sent together with the original message to Alice. A 
hash is the result of the performance of a hashing function, such as SHA-1 or MD5, on 
the message, resulting in a message digest that cannot be “reversed” back to the original 
message by any existing means, even by the message originator. Alice, upon receipt of 
the message, first hashes the accompanying message, then proceeds to use Bob’s public  
key to decrypt the encrypted hashed message that Bob sent along with the original 
message. If the decrypted hashed message and the new hash match, then the sender’s 
identity is established.  
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3. Supporting PKI Standards 
A suite of established and recognized standards supports the implementation of 
PKI. Chief among the standards is the standard that addresses the format of the digital 
certificate and the protocol used to support authentication via smart card-type tokens. 
These and other standards are discussed in the rest of this section. 
a. X.509 
The X.509 standard (RFC 5280) defines one possible format of a digital 
certificate. The digital certificate is the basis for the authenticity of a freely available 
public key. The digital certificate is composed primarily of the name of the user and the 
AO, the user’s public key, the validity period of the public key, the identifier for the type 
of cryptographic algorithm used, and the digital signature of the AO [26]. The AO’s 
digital signature signifies the validity of the information provided in the certificate, 
notably the binding of the user’s identity to the user’s public key. X.509 also specifies the 
format of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The CRL is a time-stamped list of all 
certificates that have been revoked and can no longer be relied upon. The CRLs are 
signed by the issuer and, like public keys, are available publicly. Prior to reliance on any 
public key found within a submitted digital certificate, a check should be made against 
the most recently published CRL to ensure that the certificate a) has a valid AO signature, 
b) has not expired, c) does not appear on a CRL, and d) is being used as intended. 
b. Transport Layer Security Protocol 
The most widely used protocol for securing e-commerce transactions is 
the Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS). Designed to provide “privacy and data 
integrity between two communicating applications” [27], TLS is widely accepted and 
well supported. Transaction security is achieved first through conducting mutual 
authentication and thereafter establishing a secure channel for the exchange of data. 




the necessary tokens for user authentication. With the NAF in place, users can be 
authenticated to the SP using TLS via their public-private key-pairs. The authentication 
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   TLS Authentication Process  
The user sends to the SP a message, ClientHello, indicating the user’s 
intention to establish a connection, shown in step one. The ClientHello message contains 
the version of TLS in use, a client_random number, RC, a list of applicable cipher suites, 
and a list of compression methods. The SP server, upon receipt of the message, responds 
in kind with a chain of messages. The first message, ServerHello, contains a field 
indicating the TLS version in use by the server, a server_random number, RS, the cipher 
suite selected by the server, and the compression method selected by the server, 
represented by the respective standardized cipher suite and compression method IDs. 
This is followed by the X.509-formatted server digital certificate. If the SP wishes to 
authenticate the user, a CertificateRequest message is appended as well. This message 
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chain from the server, as shown in step two, is concluded with the message 
ServerHelloDone. The user, upon detection of ServerHelloDone, proceeds to transmit its 
own message chain to the SP, commencing with the user’s X.509-formatted digital 
certificate. The second message in the chain is a server public key–encrypted user-
generated 48-byte pseudorandom number premaster secret, S. This is followed by a 
CertificateVerify message, which is a user digitally signed hash of all previous messages 
used in the handshaking process. The final message in the chain, the Finished message, is 
substantially different from the other messages in the chain: its contents are the encrypted 
hash of all previous messages utilizing a symmetric key, K, derived from the 48-byte 
pseudorandom number, S, the client_random number, RC, and the server_random 
number, RS; hence, K=f(S,RC,RS). The user-message chain is shown in step three. The 
server likewise responds to the user with its own Finished message, a hashed message 
digest of all previous transacted messages also encrypted with K. Note that key K, known 
only to the user and the SP, will be used to encrypt and decrypt all further 
communications between the two, ensuring confidentiality. Mutual authentication is 
assured in a few ways. Firstly, the 48-byte pseudorandom number S used to generate the 
key K was encrypted with the AO-certified SP server’s public key. The SP server will 
only be able to generate the correct K if it possesses the corresponding private key which 
allows the server to decrypt and obtain the 48-byte pseudorandom seed number S. The 
user is likewise authenticated by the server through verification of the digital signature 
submitted as part of the CerificateVerify message. The accurate exchange of the Finished 
messages is proof that both the user and the server have derived the correct K from the 
list of transactions. If at any time any of the transmissions in the process should fail, the 
connection is immediately terminated. 
4. Infrastructure 
The implementation of PKI is not just dependent on the identification of the 
correct standards, but also on the implementation of these standards in a manner that 
ensures security. Examples of sub-par implementations of otherwise trustworthy 
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standards include WEPs implementation of RC4. In PKI, two key functions have been 
identified, certificate issuance and certificate revocation. 
a. Certificate Issuance 
The issuance of certificates to both users and SPs (collectively termed 
client henceforth in this section, both being clients to the AO) alike is key to the 
implementation of PKI. It is the trust that both parties place in the AO having correctly 
executed the necessary identity background checks prior to issuance of a certificate that is 
the basis of PKI. In this regard, the AO may play the role of the Certification Authority 
(CA), or the Registration Authority (RA), or both. The latter is responsible for the 
generation of the asymmetric key-pair, maintenance of the validity of the key-pair, and 
issuing the key-pair to the dependent client, while the former creates the corresponding 
digital certificate. For a client to receive certification, the client must positively prove his 
identity, often in person to the RA. Due to the importance of the CA, the operations of a 
CA are often governed by legislation [28]. 
b. Key Recovery 
Once a client’s public-private key-pair is in use, the client may face issues 
of having misplaced the private key. In such situations, there is a need to have in place 
mechanisms for key back-up and/or recovery. This responsibility remains with the 
CA/RA; a mutual agreement with the client about the proper procedures to follow in such 
an event should be established during issuance. The notion of a private key being kept by 
a second party other than the client may prove to be the undoing of the reliability of the 
said key for non-repudiation. A work-around involves each client having two sets of key- 
pairs: one set for confidentiality, i.e., encryption/decryption of data purposes; and one set 
for integrity, i.e., digital signature purposes. The private key used for decryption of data 
may then be kept by a trusted third party. 
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c. Certificate Revocation 
While the validity of a certificate is checked during an authentication 
transaction, there may be events that lead to the premature invalidation of a public key, 
rendering a digital certificate void. Beyond natural expiration of a key and the need for 
regeneration, there is also a requirement that a mechanism be in place that ensures that 
the relying party in a transaction be able to retrieve data stating that the said public key 
has not been invalidated prematurely. This check on invalidation is made through 
comparison against a CRL, generally maintained by the issuing CA. Should a certificate 
be found to be on a CRL, dependence on the certificate is immediately suspect. Proper 
distribution infrastructure must be put in place for the proper dissemination of the CRLs 
to the relying parties. Protocols that support revocation include the Online Certificate 
Status Protocol, and the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol [29]. The format of the 
CRL is defined by the X.509 standard. 
C. IDENTITY FRAMEWORK (NON-REPUDIATION NON-SUPPORTING) 
1. Overview 
The current state-of-the-art in NRNS frameworks can be divided into two 
opposing camps [30], user-centric and federated. User-centric frameworks, as the name 
suggests, place the user in a position optimized for user control of the authentication 
process: the user is the initiator as well as conduit for the authentication process 
information flow. In this form, user privacy is greatly enhanced. Implementations that 
can be classified as user-centric are OpenID and a collective group known as Infocard. 
Federated frameworks were designed to provide SSO functionality within a circle of pre-
established trust relationships, or a federation. The user continues to play an active, 
though relatively diminished, role in federated frameworks: interactions between AOs 
and SPs may pass over the user in favor of the already established connections between 
the two. The two leading standards supporting federation are the Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) v2.0 and Web Services Federation (WS-Federation) 
standards. Each standard is detailed below. 
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2. OpenID 
The OpenID framework was developed based upon the principle whereby a user 
may authenticate through presentation of a Web resource that the user controls [31]. 
Simply put, authentication is dependent upon the user proving ownership of the said 
resource [32]. OpenID is an evolving framework with widespread adoption on the 
Internet; notable AOs include those of Google and Yahoo, with Facebook and MySpace 
as implementers. Its popularity stems from its simplicity of use; no additional software or 
hardware is required—at least, not in its present form—and there is no requirement for a 
password. Currently, in v2.0 of its implementation, responsibility for development of 
OpenID is undertaken by the community-based OpenID Foundation. Built upon OASIS 
standards (XRI, XRDS), OpenID itself has yet to achieve widespread peer recognition as 
a standard. However, it has attained U.S. approval for use as an identity authentication 
framework in support of low-risk transactions; all derived data from the authentication 
are to be treated as unreliable [33]. This assurance classification is due in part to the 
documented susceptibility of the framework to phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks 
[30].  
 
Figure 7.   OpenID Authentication Process Flow Diagram. After [32] 
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Figure 7 depicts the authentication process in OpenID. A Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL) address or Extensible Resource Identifier (XRI-ID) is used as a user’s 
identifier. A user may obtain the identifier through pre-registration with an AO. Once at 
the SP’s login portal, the user presents the said identifier, shown in step one. In step two, 
the SP evokes the XRI Resolution Protocol (XRI-Res) to discover the identity of the 
supporting AO based on the submitted identifier, followed by the establishment of a 
shared secret between the two, as shown in step three. The user is then re-directed to the 
AO, as in step four, followed by authentication with the AO, as in step five. Note that this 
authentication in itself can leverage any of the token types previously mentioned in 
Chapter II. Once verified, the user is redirected back to the SP with an assertion from the 
AO, as in step six [32]. 
3. Infocard 
Infocard refers to a collection of proposed implementations that are based on the 
notion of the submission of an Information Card (I-card) to enable authentication. The I-
cards are stored in and selected from a repository known as a card selector, software that 
manages all of a user’s I-cards. Leading implementations of the Infocard methodology 
include Microsoft’s CardSpace and the InCommon framework. To date, CardSpace has 
been included with recent versions of Windows [34], while the InCommon framework is 
undergoing reviews for use for e-government purposes in the United States [35]. 
CardSpace itself leverages upon the Web Services (WS*) suite of standards as its 
infrastructure, though CardSpace itself has yet to be accepted as an industry standard 
[36]. With CardSpace as the dominant implementation for the Infocard framework, it will 
be used as the basis for the rest of the discussion. 
As can be seen in Figure 8, in CardSpace, each time a user accesses a service 
requiring authentication, the SP will reply with a request for a security token, as shown in 
step one. The user selects the appropriate security I-card from the card selector software 
and presents this card as the security token to the SP, as shown in step two. Two types of 
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Figure 8.   CardSpace Authentication Flow Process. After [36] 
cards may be submitted. A Personal Card is a self-asserted/created card containing details 
that will facilitate authentication, such as a user ID and password combination. A 
Managed Card is one that is provided by an AO; it typically requires a secondary 
authentication step to be undertaken between the AO and the user, as shown in step three, 
before a token is made available by the AO, shown in step four. The said token is 
reviewed by the user and then forwarded to the SP, shown in step five. If the token is 
accepted by the SP, the user is then granted access to the service, completing the 
authentication process.  
Because the card selector is a single repository for all of a user’s digital identities, 
it is a prime target for the determined attacker. However, it is also claimed that the card 
selector may decrease its susceptibility to phishing through warnings should the user 
transact with a new service, or through customized tokens that are only useful to the SP 
and no others, thereby preventing a replay attack [35].  
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4. Security Assertion Markup Language  
SAML, at its core, is not strictly an authentication framework. It is, as the name 
suggests, a standard that dictates how assertions are to be formatted for transmission 
between parties in a form that is non-proprietary. This can even be leveraged by user-
centric frameworks. Building upon this base specification, though, are components that, 
when put together, define an eponymous composite standard for authentication. First 
defined in November 2002, the standard has since seen a major revision, emerging as 
SAML v2.0 in 2005. This new version incorporates inputs from then-leading 
implementations of Federated Identity, including those of the Liberty Alliance and the 
Internet2 Shibboleth project. It is the only specification to have received recognition as a 
federated identity management standard by the Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards (OASIS). 
The components previously mentioned, as captured in Figure 9, collectively 
define the relationship and possible interactions between the user, AO, and SP. At its core 
is the assertion component, the primary construct that serves to affirm the identity of a 
user. Each assertion contains authentication, attribute, and authorization decision 
statements; each statement is composed of data necessary for authentication sandwiched 
between standardized XML tags. The protocol component defines the SAML protocols 
that are leveraged upon for interactions via a request/response mechanism. The bindings 
 
Figure 9.   SAML v2.0 Component Affiliations.After [37] 
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component provides the linkage between SAML protocols and the underlying non-SAML 
transport layer protocols. The profile component specifies how combinations of assertion, 
protocol, and binding components are amalgamated to support a specific function. It is 
this profile component that provides a tangible expression of how SAML can be 
leveraged to support authentication, this expression differentiates SAML from non-
SAML frameworks that only use the base assertion component in their specifications. 
The Web Browser SSO Profile will be used to illustrate SAML’s use. 
As is shown in Figure 10 step 1, the user visits the SP site to access a service. As 
the user has not been authenticated, the user is redirected to the AO for authentication, 
depicted by step 2. In step 3, the user authenticates to the AO through a pre-established 
authentication means. Step 4 sees the AO build an assertion that signifies that the user’s 
identity has been affirmed upon verification. The user is thereafter directed back to the SP 
by the AO with the assertion in tow, completing the authentication process, as in step 5. 
 
Figure 10.   SAML Authentication Process Flow Diagram 
5. WS-Federation Language 
WS-Federation Language (WS-F) was developed to provide SSO-federated 
functionality as part of the WS* suite of specifications. It defines how authentication, 
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authorization, attribute, and pseudonym services can be effected via reliance on an 
underlying Security Token Service (STS) [38]; STS itself is a specification of WS-Trust, 
a mechanism developed for the management of security tokens or assertions. The 
services that WS-F offers are similar to those of SAML but optimized for a Web-services 
environment. The WS* suite of standards was developed jointly by a consortium of 
industry heavyweights, including Microsoft, IBM, and BEA, to meet the challenges of 
Internet 2.0 and the growing interest in systems developed based upon the Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA). While core specifications upon which WS-F is reliant have 
achieved OASIS recognition (WS-Security, WS-SecurityPolicy, WS-Trust), WS-F itself 
has yet to achieve standardization. As WS-F relies on STS, the WS-Trust model will be 
used to illustrate how authentication is performed using the WS-F standard.   
Figure 11 depicts the STS authentication process [39]. A user requires a service 
from an SP residing in a separate trust domain. To access the desired service, he 
willrequire a security token from his AO(User)/STS provider and an access token from 
the AO(SP)/STS provider that governs/resides in the target trust domain which the SP 
recognizes. The user proceeds to obtain his security token from AO(User), as seen in step 
one. This is achieved through a pre-determined authentication means. Because both AOs 
have an on-going trust relationship, the security token presented to the other AO by the 
user is accepted in step two, and an access token is granted to the user in step three. The 




Figure 11.   WS-F authentication Process Flow Diagram [After 39] 
6. Evaluation Criteria 
To determine the best-fit framework in support of the NRNS component of the 
NAF, the following criteria have been derived, based upon requirements set forth by the 
NAF. 
a. Fit-for-purpose 
The selected framework must be fit-for-purpose, supporting the 
deployment characteristics of the NAF. These include supportability for NRNS tokens, 
and use of the NAF as a second authentication factor to the established SINGPASS 
infrastructure. 
b. Standards-based 
The selected framework must be based upon established standards. The 
availability of a certification service is an advantage. Differentiation is made with 
dependence upon a standard and actual accreditation. 
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c. Interoperable 
The selected framework must be able to accommodate and integrate with 
existing and future standards/frameworks. 
d. Ease-of-use 
The selected framework must be usable for the majority of the population, 
presenting the least inconvenience in terms of hardware and software reliance. 
7. Evaluation and Analysis 
Each framework was assessed based on the stated criteria, with the results 
summarized in Table 2. 
a. OpenID 
OpenID, as a complete authentication protocol standard, will add an 
additional layer of complexity when integrated into the existing SINGPASS system. A 
user will not only have to supply his SINGPASS password but additionally will have to 
input the required URL/XRI-based identifier and any subsequent token required of the 
authentication process proper. Current implementations rely upon passwords for 
authentication. Although this does not exclude the option of using other tokens, the 
dearth of any actual implementations will continue to render OpenID suspect in this area. 
While OpenID is based upon XRI, OpenID itself, as a standard, lacks third-party 
accreditation. This deficiency may be mitigated by the open-source nature of the 
standard, akin to JAVA, whereby its advancement is dependent upon a community of 
developers. In terms of interoperability, not being XML-based, as compared to SAML 
and WS-F, may limit its extensibility as well as interoperability. The additional 
complexity involved should OpenID be adopted may nullify its simplicity and ease-of-
use, as will the possible use of hardware tokens for authentication. URLs and XRIs are 




Hardware tokens do not have a software-based alternative that can be 
implemented as an I-card, nor can hardware tokens be supported as a Managed Card. In 
its current implementation, Infocard only supports the X.509 and Kerberos standards 
[36]. This demands a separate framework be implemented in addition to Infocard to 
manage hardware tokens. That Infocard is built upon WS* standards allows for some 
interoperability. The usability and corresponding ease-of-use of a card selector is 
dependent upon the actual interface presented. The requirement for the installation of 
card selector software is a substantial additional requirement when compared to the other 
frameworks but may well serve as a convenient tool for the management of digital 
certificates as a managed card, complementing PKI. 
c. SAML 
SAML does not specify the authentication method but provides a means 
whereby assertions can be transmitted between AOs, thus supporting one of the key 
required characteristics of the use case in Chapter II. It is an established standard, 
endorsed by OASIS, and adopted by numerous countries [40]–[42] as part of their 
identity management infrastructure. Being XML-based, SAML is expected to be 
interoperable with like systems. An official certification body also exists to ensure 
products comply with the SAML standard. There exist specifications that integrate 
SAML with foundational WS* standards other than WS-F. The use of SAML is 
transparent to the user, leveraging on currently existing HTTP request/redirect protocol 
for data exchange. 
d. WS-F 
WS-F provides similar functionality to SAML; although it has yet to be 
ratified by OASIS, it is in the process. The complexity involved in realizing WS-F, being 
reliant on numerous foundational building blocks, permits it greater extensibility, not 
least of which is its Web services nature. Products offering WS-F will also implement 
SAML; that implementation does remove the differences between the two to a degree 
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[43]. The use of WS-F is likewise transparent to the user, but is more suited to 
applications that evoke Web services, an architecture that has yet to be fully established, 
though is expected to be further developed in the future [44]. 
Table 2.   Authentication Framework Comparison 
 OpenID Infocard SAML WS-F 
Fit-for-
purpose 
  Y Y 
Standards-
based 
Y Y Y Y 
Accredited Open-Source  Y In-process 
Interoperable   Y Y 
Ease-of-Use  Dependent Y Y 
 
From the results of the analysis, it is evident that SAML is the framework 
of choice, with WS-F as a credible alternative. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the characteristics of various identity frameworks have been 
detailed, discussed, and compared as a means of selecting the best framework to 
implement the National Authentication Framework. Inherent characteristics of the 
selected frameworks will serve as the basis for infrastructure deployment, system 
implementation, and future development, underlining the importance of ensuring that the 
selected framework not only meets current requirements but also will be sufficiently 
extensible to meet future needs. Public Key Infrastructure is a well-established 
framework that will provide for non-repudiation. For non-repudiation non-supporting 
authentication, SAML is the framework of choice. The next chapter will delve into 
greater detail as to how SAML will realize the baseline use case. 
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V. NAF IMPLEMENTATION MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter IV established the basis for the selection of SAML as the standard for the 
implementation of the non-repudiation non-supporting infrastructure of the NAF. The 
realization of the use case as specified in Chapter II will be based upon features organic 
to SAML. This chapter will provide details as to how each selected feature will realize a 
certain aspect of the use case, and will conclude with an illustration of how the various 
features converge to realize the use case. 
B. NAF SAML PROFILE 
1. Overview 
At its highest layer of abstraction, SAML specifies profiles to fulfill certain 
functionalities required during authentication. The Web Browser SSO Profile (WBSP), 
which dictates the interactions between the user, SP, and AO in an authentication process, 
will first be described, as per the prescribed standard as endorsed by OASIS. Thereafter, 
key features and attributes of SAML necessary to enhance the functionality of the WBSP 
for the NAF will be discussed. 
2. Web Browser SSO Profile 
The SAML v2.0 Technical Overview [45] describes how a user authenticates to 
an SP via the WBSP. Underlying the transaction is the ubiquitous Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), wherein its relationship with SAML is specified as part of the SAML 
Bindings abstraction. The choice of an SP-initiated process is in sync with current 
practice whereby a user navigates to the SP page to initiate authentication. This is 
opposed to an AO-initiated process, where the user navigates first to an AO, prior to 






Figure 12.   Web Browser SSO Profile. After [45] 
A user attempts to access a resource but is denied by the SP pending 
authentication, shown in step one. In step two, the SP sends an HTTP Redirect response 
to the user’s Web browser, specifying the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the AO, 
appended with an <AuthnRequest> message encoded as a URL query variable. The 
user’s browser, upon receipt of the HTTP Redirect response, issues an HTTP Get request 
to the AO’s authentication service, with the same <AuthnRequest> appended. Step three 
sees the AO interpret the <AuthnRequest> to determine the specific requirements of the 
SP for authentication and thereafter proceeds to authenticate the user through a token 
presented by the user, as shown in step four. Upon positive authentication in step five, the 
AO proceeds to build an assertion and returns this assertion, placed in a <Response> 
message as an HTML form to the user’s browser. This HTML form is subsequently sent 
to the user as a redirect to be forwarded to the relying SP as an HTTP POST request, 
depicted in step six. The SP validates the authenticity of the assertion and thereafter 




3. Proxy Authentication Operator 
The <AuthnRequest> message, as depicted in the previous section, is the key 
message sent by the SP to initiate an authentication request to an AO. The 
<AuthnRequest> message contains substantial information specifying the authentication 
context required in order for the user to gain access to the requested service. Critical 
contextual factors include the level or strength of the authentication method, as specified 
by the <RequestedAuthnContext> subfield, the SP-defined user’s transactional ID as 
specified in the <NameIDPolicy> subfield, and the list of recognized AOs with regards to 
the SP, as specified in the <Scoping> subfield. A notable characteristic of the use case 
developed in Chapter II is the ability of the SP’s AO (AO(SP)) to seek user 
authentication from the user’s AO (AO(User)). This capability is realized by 
specifications enclosed within the <Scoping> subfield, which allows for the actual 
authentication of the user to be transferred to a secondary AO, a transaction known as 
proxying.  
Since AO(User) may not be similar to the AO(SP), there is a need for the AO(SP) 
to seek an assertion from AO(User) and, thereafter transfer the assertion generated by the 
AO(User) to the SP. This is realized through AO(SP) generating an <AuthnRequest> 
message of its own and once more redirecting the user to AO(User). The assertion 
generated from AO(User) is first received by the AO(SP), which proceeds to extract the 
assertion from the HTTP Post request, repackage the assertion into a form recognizable 
by the SP, and thereafter forward the assertion once more as an HTTP Post request. This 
functionality is only possible if certain conditions are met within the <Scoping> subfield. 
The first is for the <ProxyCount> subfield within that of <Scoping> to be set to more 
than 0. This figure, as obtained from the SP, specifies the number of proxy operations 
allowed by the SP for authentication. The user’s AO must also reside in a list documented 
in the <IDPList> subfield as the list of AOs that the SP trusts to provide authentication. 
The token used by the AO also has to conform to the minimal standard imposed by the 
<RequestedAuthnContext> element as stated in the <AuthnContextClassRef> and its 
<Comparison> subfield. The <AuthnContextClassRef> defines the type of token with the 
least amount of assurance acceptable for the authentication. The <Comaprison> field has 
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a value of “minimum,” indicating that the actual authentication token used cannot be 
lower in assurance than that set in <AuthnContextClassRef>. The relationship between 
the messages and subfields described in this paragraph are summarized in Figure 13. 
 
    <AuthnRequest> 
     <saml : Subject> 
      <NameID> 
       <SPNameQualifier> 
       <SPProvidedID> 
<NameIDPolicy> 
 <Format>   
<RequestedAuthnContext> 
    <AuthnContextClassRef> 
    <Comparison> 
<Scoping> 
    <ProxyCount> 
    <IDPList> 
  
Figure 13.    <AuthnRequest> Fields Extract. After [46] 
4. Transient Identifier 
An identifier is attached to an <AuthnRequest> to associate the user, or subject, of 
the authentication. To ensure user privacy, a one-time use transient identifier is proposed 
over the use of a persistent identifier. A persistent identifier, while limited to only 
between that of the SP and the AO, may allow for the unwarranted collation of past and 
present authentication attempts by the user. A transient identifier, being single-use, is 
only valid for one instance of an authentication transaction and requires regeneration for 
each subsequent transaction. With reference to Figure 13, the transient identifier is a 
pseudorandom number generated by the SP and appended to an <AuthnRequest> via the 
<SPProvidedID> field. The SP also sets the <SPNameQualifier> with its own unique ID, 
and specifies that the identifier used is a transient one in <Format>. The setting of the 
<Format> field allows the receiving AO to know that the <SPProvidedID> is transient in  
nature and cannot be relied upon for subsequent authentication requests, where a new 
identifier will be expected. In a proxying relationship, the same <SPProvidedID> is 
expected to remain constant for the instance of the authentication transaction. 
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5. Response 
The AO, having verified a user’s submitted token, issues the assertion in a 
<Response> message, which is subsequently redirected to the requesting SP. A 
<Response> message is essentially a carrier for the assertion. The assertion will contain 
the following attributes as captured in Figure 14: <Version> states the version of the 
assertion, by default being 2.0. The <ID> is a unique one-time randomly generated 
identifier for the specific assertion, minimally 128 bits in length. <IssueInstant> states the 
time that the assertion was generated. <Issuer> captures the identifier of the submitting 
AO. <ds:Signature> is required for authentication of the assertion itself, originating from 
a credible source through the application of a digital signature. <Subject> contains the 
transient identifier issued originally by the requesting SP. 
 
    <Response> 
     <Assertion> 
      <Version> 
      <ID> 
      <IssueInstant> 
      <Issuer> 
      <ds:Signature> 
      <Subject> 
 
Figure 14.   <Response> Fields Extract. After [46] 
C. USE CASE REALIZATION 
This section depicts the basis use case, developed in Chapter II, being realized by 




Figure 15.   Authentication Use Case 
1. Conversation #1: The user submits the first legacy authentication token 
(SINGPASS password) to the SP, which proceeds to authenticate this first token. Should 
the token be invalid, the connection is immediately terminated.  
2. Conversation #2: Should the token be valid, the SP issues an HTTP 
Redirect response to the user’s browser (Browser(U)), directing the user to AO(SP) with 
an <AuthnRequest> message appended. The AO(SP) authentication server receives the 
<AuthnRequest>; from the analysis of the <IDPList> field, it determines the acceptable 
AOs that the SP authorizes for the generation of an assertion and generates a Web Page 
that allows the user to select the appropriate authorized AO. Note that the AO(SP) would 




whether any particular user has a relationship with it, and AO(SP) therefore cannot 
automatically initiate the establishment of a second-factor authentication process with the 
user. 
3. Conversation #3: The user selects the appropriate AO(User). If AO(User) 
is AO(SP), then AO(SP) will continue with authentication and the generation of the 
assertion. If AO(User) is another entity, the AO(SP) will now transit into the role of a 
proxying AO and issue an HTTP Redirect response once more to Browser(U) and direct 
the user to AO(User) with an <AuthnRequest> appended. 
4. Conversation #4: The user proceeds to submit his token and any other 
necessary attributes (e.g., identifier unique to AO(User)) to the AO(User) for 
authentication. The AO(User), having verified the identity of the user, will generate an 
assertion in a <Response> message and return the user to AO(SP) via an HTML form. 
5. Conversation #5: AO(SP) extracts the assertion and repackages it into a 
form unique to itself and the relying SP, and returns the assertion in a <Response> 
message via an HTML form to the SP. Note that AO(User) remains as the originator of 
the assertion. AO(SP) merely edits the necessary fields in the <Response> message to 
enable communication between it and the SP.  
6. Conversation #6: The SP, having received the assertion, proceeds to allow 
the user access to the requested service. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, it has been shown that SAML has many built-in features that 
support the realization of the use case. Among the more pertinent features are the ability 
to proxy an authentication request, to define a transient identifier, and to dictate the AOs 
and token type assurance levels suitable to the supported transaction. That SAML also 
defines profiles encompassing supporting protocols shows how it can be easily realized 
with current technology. SAML is sufficiently robust to meet the requirements of future 
challenges, being organically highly extensible. The choice of SAML as the basis 
standard ensures that the NAF will be effectively and efficiently realized.  
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The NAF is an ambitious project, not just in terms of scale, but also in terms of 
scope. There has yet to be a similar effort at implementing a national two-factor 
authentication system with the amount of choice available to the user. In so doing, several 
important lessons can be derived which will be elaborated upon in this chapter. The 
chapter will conclude with suggestions for further research into this novel effort. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED: COMPROMISES 
In stating the requirements for the NAF, two elements stand out that have had 
broad implications on the eventual implementation model. Firstly, the NAF is to be 
implemented in concert with the operational single-factor authentication system. 
Secondly, non-repudiation is a criterion for the system. This section will detail the 
implications of these two system requirements. 
1. Co-existence 
The legacy password-based SINGPASS authentication system, still currently in 
use, will continue to serve as the first authentication factor. Support for SINGPASS 
remains the domain of a single operator, contracted by the government for its operation. 
While the operation of SINGPASS remains distinct from the SAML-based second-factor 
authentication, its continued existence implies that, in the short term, the NAF would 
play, at best, a complimentary role. That SINGPASS, if kept in its current form, 
diminishes the practicality of implementing a non-SAML NAF framework; for instance, 
the implementation of OpenID (non-SAML) would require the user to input a second 
what-you-know identifier in addition to that already required for SINGPASS. The 
benefits of the NAF to the user are also diminished, as the user would still be required to 
use the services of both the government-dictated Authentication Operator (AO) for 
SINGPASS, and another AO for the second factor. The operator for SINGPASS is also 
 56
placed at a competitive advantage over its peers. Being the long-standing solution, it not 
only has the advantage of reputation, but will be well placed to offer synergistic services 
incorporating both the first and second authentication factors in spite of any technical and 
operational differences between SINGPASS and the NAF. While the continuance of 
SINGPASS may have very much been a contractual issue, that the government continues 
to leverage on a proprietary legacy system while proposing and pushing for an enterprise 
one may also diminish the acceptance of the NAF in the eyes of possible private-sector 
users, particularly the banking industry, which already has 2FA authentication systems in 
place. This may result in the authentication landscape remaining status quo for the user 
except for the addition of yet another token for purposes of government services. It is 
recognized that SINGPASS would play a role during the transition phase as part of the 
roll-out of the NAF. Once the implementation issues for the NAF have been resolved and 
the schedule put in place for its roll-out, however, it would be helpful for the government 
to announce the road map for the eventual dissolution of SINGPASS and for the full 
transition to the NAF, wherein both tokens used for authentication would be a result of 
the user’s choice. That would provide the impetus for wider adoption of the NAF and the 
full realization of the system’s stated objective. 
2. Non-repudiation 
Among the requirements set forth for the NAF is that of non-repudiation for 
access to certain services. This requirement for non-repudiation, though entirely logical, 
immediately limits the type of token used to that of the asymmetrical cryptographic type. 
With such a requirement, each user of government services will be required to have in his 
possession an asymmetric cryptographic token, making such a token the default choice 
for users and thus limiting the take-up rate of other token types. This brings up the 
relative costs of using other token types, which may make owning other tokens 
financially and practically infeasible. This remains, in public policy parlance, a wicked 
problem. The requirement for non-repudiation cannot be rescinded easily, as doing so 
would result in an Integrity issue. Yet continuing with the existence of the requirement 
for non-repudiation would limit the market for non-asymmetric cryptographic token 
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types. It is then best left to the academic community to devise an alternate token type that 
also provides non-repudiation as a direct competitor to that of an asymmetric 
cryptographic token. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As of December 2009, the NAF is in its consultative stage whereby comments 
and proposals are being sought from both industry and academia. One area in which work 
will be needed is a study of the actual implementation model that is adopted and the basis 
for the selection of the various underlying technologies that support the implemented 
model. Next, a post-implementation review of the implemented system would also yield 
important lessons that would be useful for other organizations that may wish to embark 
on a similar type project. 
D. SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis was to propose an implementation model for the NAF. A 
baseline use case was first developed to outline the relationships between the user, the SP 
and the AO, to be used as the main reference in the application of supporting 
technologies. Thereafter, a survey of current token types was conducted, with each token 
type being assessed for its suitability for use in the NAF, susceptibility to security threats, 
and provision of non-repudiation being major criteria. The asymmetric cryptographic 
token type has been selected for use where non-repudiation is required, and the OTP and 
Out of Band token has been selected for use where non-repudiation is not required. 
Following, five leading identity frameworks were assessed for their suitability. The 
frameworks were assessed based on whether they were fit-for-purpose, were standards-
based, were interoperable, and were easy-to-use. SAML emerged as the framework of 
choice where non-repudiation was not required, while PKI would serve as the framework 
where non-repudiation was required. How SAML would be used to meet the 
requirements of the AO was also described in detail, particularly the ability for proxy 
authentication and the use of transient identifiers. It was observed that several 
requirements for the NAF have had an asymmetric effect on the eventual implementation 
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model, particularly the need for co-existence with a legacy system and the need for non-
repudiation. It has been suggested that the legacy system be retired as early as possible 
and that an alternative token type, which would provide non-repudiation, be worked on. 
As part of future research, it would be extremely instructive to continue to follow the 
development of the NAF to its conclusion, because much can be learned and applied to 
subsequent exercises of the same nature. 
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